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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff /Respondent
vs.

DENNIS A. HEAPS,

Case No. 19254

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Dennis A. Heaps, appeals from the judgment
and conviction by the Court sitting without a jury in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County,

.

State of Utah, the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge,
presiding, of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted
Person, a Felony in the Second Degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted on April 25, 1983 and was
sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term
of one to fifteen years, concurrent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction of Possession
of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person, a Second Degree
Felony, in the Court below.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
on January 25, 1983, Salt Lake City police office1·
Henry Huish

stopped a truck and, at gunpoint, required all of

the occupants to exit the vehicle with their hands raised; then
he handcuffed all the occupants immediately (Tr.37,46,58,68,84,
85), but did not tell them they were under arrest, although he
told them they were subject to arrest (Tr.67,68,70).

Officer

Huish then searched the vehicle and found a firearm under the
passenger side of the truck's bench seat, approximately 12 to 18
inches from the passenger side door

(Tr.59,60).

Officer Huish subsequently questioned each of the occupant'
about who the gun belonged to, how it got there, and what it
was doing

~here

(Tr.62).

He talked first to David McCoy, the

owner and driver of the truck; he spoke with Mike Perry second,
with a juvenile girl third, and with appellant last (Tr.62).
David McCoy was the only witness who testified that the
gun was in appellant's possession (Tr.35,45).

Mike Perry,

another occupant of the truck, testified that he t0ld Officer
Huish that he had not seen the gun before (Tr.87), and that he
did not tell Officer Huish that the gun was in appellant's
possession (Tr.100,101).

Appellant testified that he knew

nothing about the gun and that he so told Officer Huish on the
day he was arrested (Tr.114,124,125).
At the time of appellant's arrest for this offense, David
McCoy was on felony probation; McCoy thought that a conviction,
especially for possession of a firearm, would very likely cause
-2-

~

cevocation of his probation and would cause him to be sent

to prison (Tr.52,53,54,55).
At appellant's trial in this case, David McCoy testified
that appellant had the gun in his possession (Tr.35,45).

Mike

Perry testified that, after all the occupants of the truck
except appellant werB released, David McCoy made a statement to
Perry regarding who had possession of the gun (Tr.90-98).

The

Court would not allow Perry to testify about the contents of
McCoy's statement as it kept sustaining the prosecution's hearsay
objection (Tr.90-98).

It is clear, however, from a reading of

that portion of the transcript that McCoy's prior statement,
made at the scene of the arrest, was inconsistent with his
testimony at trial.
Also, at appellant's trial Officer Huish testified that
"one reason" for his stopping the truck was that he observed
an improper lane

change; he never articulated any other reasons

for the stop, if there were any (Tr.58,65).
further testified that he never gave McCoy or

Officer Huish
a~yone

a citation

for the traffic violation (Tr.64,65), and McCoy confirmed
that (Tr.51).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
INTO EVIDENCE A WITNESS' PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT REGARDING POSSESSION
OF THE FIREARM.
The trial in this case took place on April 25, 1983.
-3-

As

the new Utah Rules of Evidence were not in effect until
September 1, 1983, the applicable rule at the time of trial
was Utah Rule of Evidence 63(1) (a), as contained in Utah Code
Ann.

(1953).

That rule states:
RULE 63
HEARSAY EVIDENCE EXCLUDED--EXCEPTIONS
Evidence of a statement which is made
other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the
truth of the matter stated is hearsay
evidence and inadmissible except:
(1)
Prior Statements of Witnesses. A
prior statement of a witness, if the
judge finds that the witness had an
adequate opportunity to perceive the
event or condition which his statement
narrates, describes or explains, provided that (a) it is inconsistent with his
present testimony.

Witness David McCoy testified that appellant showed him
the gun while they were in the truck, and that appellant had
the gun tucked in the waistband of his pants.

Later in the

trial, Mike Perry, another occupant of the truck, testified as
follows, in relevant part:
A.

. David McCoy crawled
out of the police officer's car
and came over and stood next to
me.
I kind of grabbed him by the elbow
and pushed him to the side and
said, "Hey, what is going on here?"
You indicated to me that was not
Dennis Heaps' gun." (Tr.90).

-4-

Q.
A.

Did you ask him whose gun it was?
Yes, more or less indicated. Yes.
(Tr. 91).

Q.
A.

Did he say i t was Mr. Heaps' gun?
No, he did not.
(Tr. 91).

Q.

Did he give you a name as to who
the gun belonged to?
He didn't have to.
It was just me
and him standing there.
And was that Mr. Heaps?
No.
(Tr. 97)

A.

Q.
A.

Al though this testimony of Mike Perry's regarding McCoy's
prior statements were reported in the transcript, they were all
objected to as hearsay by the prosecution, and the objections were
sustained by the trial court.

Thus the trier of fact, in this

case Judge Baldwin, could not consider those statements in
reaching his verdict.

In addition, Perry was never allowed to

testify to the exact contents of McCoy's prior statement.

None-

theless, it is clear from Perry's testimony that McCoy's prior
statement did not agree with the testimony that McCoy had given
earlier in the trial.
The language of the applicable Utah Rule of Evidence
63(a) (1) carves out an exception to the general hearsay rule.
Although under this rule a prior inconsistent statement is
hearsay (as opposed to the new rule on the same subject, Rule
80l(d) (1) (A), which states that a prior inconsistent statement
is not hearsay), it is an exception to the general rule that
hearsay is not admissible.
Most or all jurisdictions, including Utah, have rules allowing
-5-

the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statement.
E.g., United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282

(4th Cir. 1982);

United States v. Coran, 589 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1978); United
States v. Plum, 558 F.2d 568

(10th Cir. 1977); United States v.

Champion International Corporation, 557 F. 2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238
Acree, 121 Ariz. 94, 588 P.2d 836

(9th Cir. 1977); State v.

(1978).

Although the juris-

dictions are not in agreement as to whether the prior statement
can be admitted substantively or for impeachment only, Utah
admits the statement substantively, both under the new and the
old rules.
follows

As stated in the Committee Note to Rule 801 which

the new Utah Rule of Evidence 801:
Subdivision (d) (1) is similar to Rule
63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971).
It deviates from the federal Rule in
that it allows use of prior statements
as substantive evidence if (1) inconsistent or (2) the witness has forgotten,
and does not require the prior statement
to have been given under oath or subject
to perjury. The former Utah Rules
admitted such statements as an exception
to the hearsay rule.
(Emphasis aclded).
The policy behind such an exception (or exclusion from

the definition of hearsay) is to protect a party from a "turncoat" witness, one who changes his story at trial.
States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282,284.

E.g.,~

The trier of fact could

decide to believe the prior statement rather than the witness's
testimony at trial.

The rule also allows the trier of fact to

u9

the witness's inconsistency to help judge the witness's credibiL'
-6-

Thus based on the inconsistency, the trier of fact could decide
that the witness is wholly or partially unworthy of belief.
In the present case, the contents of McCoy's statement
could well have caused a vital difference in appellant's case.
If, as seems likely, McCoy had stated to Perry at the scene of
appellant's arrest that appellant did not ever possess the gun
and/or that the gun was actually in his (McCoy's) possession,
the prior statement would have corroborated both appellant's
testimony at trial and his statement to Officer Huish at the
scene of the arrest.

McCoy's prior statement would, no doubt,

also have cast grave doubt on the veracity of McCoy's testimony
at trial in which he stated that the appellant had possession of
the gun while they were in the truck prior to the stopping of
the truck.
McCoy's prior inconsistent statements, therefore, should
have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule, and it
certainly cannot be deemed harmless error.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE GUN
INTO EVIDENCE AS IT IS THE FRUIT OF
APPELLANT'S ILLEGAL ARREST.
When Officer Huish stopped the truck in which appellant
was a passenger, he drew his gun and immediately required all
the occupants to exit the truck.

He then handcuffed all of them

and kept them all restrained in that way while he searched the
truck.

During his search he found a gun under the bench seat of
-7-

the truck.

Officer Huish testified that he did not tell the

handcuffed persons that they were under arrest at this time,
although he testified he told them they were subject to arrest
The restraint of appellant, and the other occupants continued
while Officer Huish questioned each one of them separately regarding the gun.

He eventually released everyone but appellant

who he took to jail and booked for Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by a Restricted Person.
When questioned at trial about his reasons for stopping
the truck, Officer Huish responded that a traffic violation he
observed the driver of the truck, McCoy, commit was "one
reason."

However, he never said what reasons, other than McCoy'

traffic violation, existed.
A.

THE STOP AND SEARCH WAS NOT A
TERRY STOP AND SEARCH

An arrest is generally defined as a deprivation of a
person's liberty by legal authority.
140(rev. 4th ed. 1968).

BLACK'S LAW

DICTIO~ARY,

There is, of course, a distinction

between an arrest and a Terry stop.

The United States Supreme

Court first established the legality of a stop which is less
intrusive than an arrest in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
In that case, the Supreme Court held that a police officer
can stop a person or a vehicle for a short period of time to
make reasonable inquiries and to conduct a limited frisk of
the person for weapons if the officer has observed unusual
conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude that criminal
-8-

activity may be afoot.
A Terry stop, therefore, is something much less severe
than an arrest.
~

Although a police officer may clearly detain

person for a brief period of time to question the person,

the detention must be of a minimal nature.

As the United States

Supreme Court recently said in explaining why an ordinary traffic
stop is analagous to a Terry stop:
Under the Fourth Amendment, we have
held, a policeman who lacks probable
cause but whose "observations lead
him reasonably to suspect" that a
particular person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a
crime, may detain that person briefly
in order to "investigate the circumstances
that provoke suspicion." Unted States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,881 (1975).
"[T]he stop and inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope to the justificaion
for their initiation." Ibid. (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 29.)
Typically,
this means that the officer may ask the
detainee a moderate number of questions
to determine his identity and to try to
obtain information confirming or dispelling
the officer's suspicions. But the detainee
is not obliged to respond. And, unless the
detainee's answers provide the officer with
probable cause to arrest him, he must then
be released.
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort
explains the absence of any suggestion in
our opinion that Terry stops are subject
to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly
noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily
detained pursuant to such stops are not "in
custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 35 Criminal Law Reporter (CCH), 3192 (1984).
In addition, although the officer may conduct a search for
-9-

weapons for his own safety, that search may not be extensive;
it may only extend to a search of the outside of the person's
clothing.

Terry v. Ohio, supra; Pirri v. State, 428 So.2d 285

(Fla. 1983).
The distinction between a Terry stop and frisk situation
and an arrest must be made on a case by case basis as there is
no clear-cut factor which distinguishes one from the other.
However, the United States Supreme Court has further clarified
the distinction in several cases it decided after Terry.

See

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Florida v.
103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229

Royer,~~

U.S.____]

(1983).

In the Dunaway case, supra, police officers took the
defendant into custody, upon less than probable cause, in
connection with an attempted robbery and homicide; the defendant
was taken to the police station and questioned.

The defendant

was never told he was under arrest, but officers admitted they
would have physically restrained him had he tried to leave the
station.

The Court held that the police conduct in this case

constituted an arrest of the defendant even if he was never so
advised, and that it clearly exceeded the confines
stop.

of a Terry

Since the police lacked probable cause to effect the

arrest, the Court held the arrest illegal and the evidence
obtained pursuant to the arrest inadmissible.
The more recent United States Supreme Court case, ~'
-10-

v.~Royer,

supra, further clarified the distinction between

arrest and a Terry stop and frisk.

In Royer, the suspicions of

drug officers were aroused when they spotted the defendant
wno fit the "drug courier profile"

(the characteristics which

apparently fit the profile were nervousness, a cash purchase
of an airline ticket under an assumed name, heavy luggage, the
25-35 year age and the casual dress of the defendant.)

Upon

the request of the officers, the defendant produced for them his
airline ticket and driver's license.

At this point, the officers

identified themselves, told the defendant they suspected him of
carrying drugs, and asked him to accompany them to a small
room forty feet away.

One officer, using the defendant's luggage

claimcheck, retrieved his luggage and brought it back to the
small room.

When asked if he would consent to a search of the

luggage, the defendant produced the luggage key which opened one
suitecase and did not object when the officers forcibly opened
the second.
Based upon this set of facts, the Court ruled that,
although the activities began as an investigative Terry-type
detention, it became an arrest when the defendant was brought
to the nearby room; as the officers lacked probable cause at
that point, the arrest was illegal.

Since the defendant's

consent to the search was tainted by the illegal arrest, the
search was also invalid and the evidence seized should have
been suppressed by the trial court, the Supreme Court ruled.
-11-

In making this decision, the Royer court made it clear
that the police may not carry out a full search of a person,
car, or other effects as part of a Terry investigatory search,
that a Terry search must be carefully tailored and limited,
and that a Terry detention must be temporary and last no longer
than necessary.
Other courts dealing with this issue have also held
that a person can be considered to be under arrest, rather than
stopped for a Terry investigation, even without being brought
to the police station for questioning.

See People v. Hazelhurst.

662 P.2d 1081 (Colo. 1983); United States v. Chamberlain, 644 F..
1262 (9th Cir. 1980).

Whether or not a person is brought to

the police station, therefore, is not the determining factor.
As stated by the court in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722
F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983):
"Detention" defines a special category
of Fourth Amendment seizures that are
substantially less intrusive than arrests
(citation omitted).
Because detention
represents only a limited intrusion, it
can be justified by a reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity (citation omitted).
However, that suspicion justifies only a
brief stop and interrogation and, under
proper circumstances, a brief check for
weapons (citation omitted).
If the
seizure involves anything more than the
brief and narrowly-defined intrusion
authorized by Terry it must be justified
by probable cause (citation omitted).
Gonzales, 722 F.2d at 477.
The use of the handcuffs and gun by Officer Huish on
-12-

appellant are certainly important factors to be considered in
deciding whehter Huish's actions constituted an arrest or
0

Terry stop.

In Burns v. State, 595 P.2d 801 (Okla. 1979), the

Cnurt ruled that a fact situation similar to the present case was
an arrest, not a Terry stop.

The Court commented, "This Court

has previously upheld the legality of investigatory stops by
police officers.
made at gunpoint,"

.. However, investigatory stops are not
(emphasis added).

Burns, 595 P.2d at 803.

In the present case, the officer's stop and subsequent
search of the vehicle were both clearly far beyond the permissible
scope allowed in a Terry stop and search.

In this case,

appellant and other occupants of the truck were o=dered out of
the truck by the officer at gunpoint and were immediately handcuffed.

The officer kept appellant and the others detained in

this manner while he searched the vehicle and then went back and
forth between them questioning each indivually about the gun he
found in the search.
~erry

Such a detention cannot be considered a

stop since appellant's liberty was so severely restricted

and the restriction was for a substantial period of time.
The search of the vehicle, too, clearly exceeded the
parameters of a Terry search in that the officer searched not
only appellant's person but also searched the truck.
A search that went beyond a pat-down of the outer clothing of a person detained for a valid Terry stop was held
illegal for exceeding the scope of such an investigaroty detention
-13-

in Pirri v. State, 428 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1983).
said:

That Court

"The police officer could only conduct a carefully

limited, self-protective search of the outer clothin_s of such
a person to discover the presence of weapons"

(emphasis

added), Pirri, 428 So.2d at 286.
B.

THE OFFICER'S CONDUCT HERE
CONSTITUTED AN ARREST OF
APPELLANT

Officer Huish testified that none of the occupants of
the vehicle were under arrest when he pointed his gun at them
and handcuffed them all.

However, courts which have dealt with

the question of when an arrest occurs have made it clear that
the words, "You are under arrest" are not "magic" words without
which an arrest cannot occur.

State v. Harrington, 430 So.2d

394 (La. 1983); State v. Christian, 454 A. 2d 262, 189 Conn. 85
(1983); McCrory v. State, 643 S.W. 2d 725 (1982).

On the contn:

the question of whether an arrest has occurred can only be
determined by looking at all the circumstances surrounding the
stop.

The United States Supreme Court, in discussing whether

a person stopped by an officer for a traffic violation was
"in custody" for Miranda

purposes even though the officer

had already silently decided to arrest the person, said:
Although Trooper Williams apparently
decided as soon as respondent stepped
out of his car that respondent would
be taken into custody and charged with
a traffic offense, Williams never communicated his intention to respondent.
A policeman's unarticulared plan has
no bearing on the question whether a
suspect was "in custody" at a particular
time; the only relevant inquiry is how
-14-

a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his
situation (emphasis added).
ucrkcmer v. McCarty, 35 Criminal Law Reporter (CCH), 3192 (1984).
The same inquiry is the proper one in deciding when an
arrest has occurred.

McQurter

v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp.

1401 (N.D.Ga. 1983); State v. Waicelunas, 672 P.2d 968 (Ariz.
1983); People v. Pancoast, 659 P.2d 1348 (Colo. 1982); Redarte

v. City of Riverton, 552 P.2d 1245 (Wyo. 1976).

An arrest can

take place regardless of whether an officer tells the person
that he is under arrest, State v. Christian, 189 Conn. 35, 454
A.2d 262 (1983); State v. Harrington, 430 So.2d 394 (La. 1983);
McCrory v. State, 643 S.W.2d 725 (1982), or whether the officer
has even decided that he is going to arrest the person.

People

v. Pancoast, supra; State v. Waicelunas, supra.
The subjective intent of the officer
is not controlling on the issue whether
an arrest has occurred; rather, the
issue rests upon an evaluation of all
the surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable man innocent
of any crime would have throught he was
being arrested if he had been in
defendant's shoes.
State v. Waicelunas, 672 P.2d at 970.
In this case, there can be very little question but that
any reasonable person in appellant's position would have believed

that he was under arrest when Officer Huish stopped the truck

in which he was riding.

The facts that support such a reasonable

conclusion are that appellant was ordered out of the truck at
-15-

gunpoint, immediately handcuffed, and forced to remain in such
a condition at the scene for quite some time while Officer
Huish searched the truck and went back and forth among the
various occupants of the truck to question each of them.
certainly, any reasonable person faced with these facts would
believe he was under arrest.
C.

APPELLANT'S ARREST WAS ILLEGAL
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides that an arrest can only be effected if there is probabl,
cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the person
arrested committed it.
(1959).

Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307

Although a lesser standard than probable cause is

required for a Terry stop, there are no exceptions to the probab
cause requriement when an arrest, rather than a Terry stop, has
taken place.

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200

(1979).

The general def ini ti on of "probable cause" is;

a reason-

able ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances suff icientl
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person in believing
the accused to be guilty.
132 (1925).
cause.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.

Mere suspicion is not enough to constitute probabl!

Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449

(1957).

In addition, probable cause must be based on reasonably
reliable information.

The facts leading to a determination tha

probable cause for an arrest exists must be of such a character
-16-

Lhat they would reasonably support a conclusion that probable
r:ause exists.

In other words, the officer making the arrest

must have "reasonably trustworthy information."
united States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).

Certainly probable cause

must be more than a "gut feeling" or a suspicion.
United States, 361 U.S. 98

Draper v.

Henry v.

(1959).

In the present case, appellant was arrested when he was
ordered out of the truck and handcuffed; Officer Huish failed
to articulate any reason for arresting appellant at that time.
The only explanation he gave for any of his actions leading up
to his finding of the gun in the truck was that an improper lane
change was "one of the reasons" for his stop of the truck.

His

only articulated reason for suspicion, then, was the traffic
violation he observed.

As appellant was not driving the truck,

he could not possibly be lawfully arrested for that.

By imply-

ing that there were, perhaps, other reasons for the stop of the
truck too does not satisfy the standard of probable cause.
D.

EVEN IF APPELLANT'S DETENTION WERE
CHARACTERIZED AS A TERRY STOP, IT
WAS ILLEGAL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
REASONABLE SUSPICION TEA'l' CRII1INAL
ACTIVITY WAS AFOOT.

Appellant, as discussed in Point II, A, supra, contends
that his detention on the day in question by far exceeded the
limits on a Terry stop.

However, even if the incident were

rharacterized as a Terry stop, it must still be deemed unlawful
because Officer Huish had no reasonable suspicion that criminal
-17-

activity was afoot.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l

(1968).

As discussed in Point II, C, supra, Officer Huish's
only articulated reason for stopping the truck was the traffic
violation corrunitted by David McCoy.

Huish's statement that

the traffic violation was "one of the reasons" for the stop
does not rise even to the level required for a Terry stop.
E.

THE GUN FOln"D IN THE SEARCH OF
THE TRUCK WAS THE POISONOUS FRUIT
OF AN ILLEGAL SEi'\:RCII. l'IU.E ":,\,

It is well settled that, generally, evidence found as a
consequence of an illegal act on the part of a police officer
must be suppressed.

Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United

States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471
(1963); Brown v. Illinois,

422 U.S.

590

(1975).

Such evidence

may be admissible only if the knowledge or evidence is gained
from a source independent from the illegal act, or if there has
been such an attenuation between the original illegal act and
the evidence that it cannot be considered a result of the
ality.

ill~-

Wong Sun v. United States, supra; United States v.

Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
In the present case, appellant was illegally

arrested~

Officer Huish as it was never established that he had probable
cause for appellant's arrest, see Point II, C, supra, nor was
it a proper Terry stop, see Point II, A, supra.

Therefore, tte

search which Officer Huish conducted pursuant to this unlawful
arrest was also illegal.
-18-

F.

APPELLAllT HAS STANDING TO RAISE
THIS ISSUE.

Until 1978, the issue of whether one has standing to
contest an illegal search was governed by Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257

(1960); that case ruled that for a defendant to

have standing to make a motion to suppress, he must have been
a victim of a search or seizure.

Jones also ruled that one who

was legitimately present on the premises searched or in the
vehicle searched had standing to make the motion to suppress.
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court decided the case of
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128

(1978), reh. den. 439 U.S. 1122.

The Rakas decision changed significantly the law of standing to
raise the issue of an illegal search ..

Rakas, however, did not

completely overrule Jones, but rather altered the standard from
the Jones inquiry into whether a person was legitimately on the
premises searched to an inquiry of whether that person had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched.
The Rakas decision, however, does not mandate that a
passenger without a property interest in either the vehicle
or the property seized be always denied standing to make a
motion to suppress.

There are still some circumstances in which

a passenger has standing to make such a motion, despite Rakas.
As stated in 3 Lafave, Search and Seizure, §11.3 (1984, Pocket
Part), at 233:
Does this mean that persons who are
"merely passengers" (i.e., asserting
neither a property nor a possessory
-19-

interest in the vehicle, nor an interest
in the property seized) will never have
standing? Although Justice Rehnquist's
opinion unfortunately does not even hint
at a stopping point short of such an
absolute rule, thus prompting some courts
to give Rakas such an interpretation, it
does not-seeffi that Rakas goes this far.
For one thing, it is important to note, as
the concurring opinion in Rakas takes great
pains to emphasize, that the "petitioners
do not challenge the constitutionality of
the police action in stopping the automobile in which they were riding; nor do
they complain of being made to get out of
the vehicle," so that the question before
the Court was "a narrow one: Did the search
of their friend's automobile after they had
left it violate any Fourth Amendment right
of the petitioners?" This would indicate,
as two-thirds of the Court (the two concurring justices and the four dissenters)
recognizes that a passenger does have
standing to object to police conduct which
intrudes upon his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizure of his
person.
If either the stopping of the car
or the passenger's removal from it are
unreasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense,
then surely the passenger has standing to
object to those constitutional violations
and to have suppressed any evidence found
in the car which is their fruit.
This reasoning

has, in fact, been followed by some coul":

who have dealt with this issue since the Rakas decision came
down.

E.g., People v. Kunath, 99 Ill.App.3d 201, 425 N.E. 2d

486 (1981).
Regardless of whether defendant had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in
the contents of the automobile so as to
challenge successfully the search thereof,
as a passenger he can challenge the stopping
of the vehicle since his personal liberty
and freedom were intruded upon by that act
(citation omitted).
The Fourth and Fourteenth
-20-

Amendments of the United States
Constitution forbids unreasonable searches
and seizures (emphasis in original) ,
and it is clear that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants
constitutes a "seizure" of those persons
(citation omitted). And, for the evidence
seized as a result of that stop to be
admissible, the stop must not have been
unreasonable.
People v. Kunath, 425 N.E. 2d at 489.
Although appellant here is contesting the legality of
his arrest, rather than the stopping of the automobile, the same
reasoning as is stated by the Kunath Court, above, applies.
In the case at bar, appellant is not prevented by the
Rakas decision from asserting that the search of the truck in
which he was riding was illegal.

The reason that appellant

may assert this issue despite Rakas is that he is contesting
the search as being the fruit of an illegal arrest.
II,A,B,C and D, supra.

See Point

As Rakas did not deal with such a

situation and is, therefore, distinguishable and since dicta
in Rakas, in fact, seems to preserve the right of a person to
contest a search which is the fruit of an illegal arrest,
appellant here has standing to raise this issue.
G.

THE PROSECUTION HAD THE BURDEN OF
ESTABLISHING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR
THE ARREST.

The general rule governing searches is that a warrant
is required.

There are exceptions to that rule, however; thus,

in certain well-defined instances, warrantless searches are
proper.
-21-

In this case, Officer Huish's search of the truck in
which appellant was riding at the time of his arrest was
warrantless.

Since appellant's arrest was illegal, then the

search was also illegal.

See Point II,A-D, supra.

Respondent may argue that there was, in fact, probable
cause for the search but that Officer Huish simply failed to
describe the basis for the probable cause at trial.

The

resol~

tion of such an issue is dependent on whose burden it is to pro
that the arrest was either justified by probable cause or that
no probable cause existed to justify the arrest.
In cases where warrantless searches are conducted, the
burden should be on the prosecution to prove that an exception
to the warrant requirement exists.
With respect to the issue which is
usually central in a motion to suppress
hearing--the reasonableness of the
challenged search or seizure--most
states follow the rule which is utilized
in the federal courts: if the search or
seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the
defendant has the burden of proof, but
if the poljce acted without a warrant
the burden of proof is on the prosecution.
The warrant--no warrant dichotomy is
typically explained on the ground that
when the police have acted with a warrant
"an independent determination on the issue
of probable cause has already been made by
a magistrate, thereby giving rise to a
presumption of legality," while when they
have acted without a warrant "the evidence
comprising probable cause is particularly
within the knowledge and control of the
arresting agencies."
[Malcom v. U.S., 332
A.2d 917 (D.C.App. 1975)] Morever, it is
said that "(w]ithout such a rule there
would be little reason for law enforcement
-22-

agencies to bother with the formality
of a warrant (Id.).
1

LaFave, Search and Seizure, §11.2, Vol. 3, p. 500 (1978).
Not all jurisdictions follow this rule, however; some

courts uniformly place the burden of proof on the prosecution
for the reason that the state is the party which seeks to use
the evidence and thus should be required to prove that it was
obtained lawfully.

See State v. Heald, 314 A.2d 820 (Ore. 1973);

Canning v. State, 226 So. 2d 747

(Miss. 1969).

place the burden uniformly on the defendant,

Other jurisdictions
see People v. Ikerd,

26 Ill. 2d 573, 188 N.E. 2d 12 (1963); State v. Holt, 415 S.W. 2d

761 (Mo. 1967), for reasons such as that the burden should be on
the moving party, there is a presumption of regularity regarding
the actions of law enforcement agencies, evidence is considered
admissible and exceptions to admissibility should be justified
by the one claiming the exception, and that such a practice will
deter frivolous claims.
As stated in 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure, §11.2 (1978)
at 500:
Placing the burden upon the defendant
even in the no warrant situation would
seem to place him in a most disadvantageous position. As one commentator has
noted, "it would be impossible for a
defendant to prove a lack of probable
cause in the abstract," for he "cannot
be expected to prove a lack of some
item until he knows on what the government bases its claim of its existence."
[Citing Symposium, 25 Ohio St.L.J. 501,
528 (1964); l

-23-

One of the most important policy concerns which must
be considered when the burden of proof is allocated on this
issue is which party has greater access to the relevant facts.
It is certainly more efficient to, thus, require the prosecut1
to carry the burden of proving that the police validly proceede.
without a warrant, for the officer(s) involved in the search
know the facts that might establish such an exception.

To

put the burden on the defendant would only result in "fishing
expeditions" by the defense since it would be trying to negate
the legality of all the possible valid grounds for the warrantless search without having the kind of access to the police
officers that the prosection has.

See Commonwealth v.

Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 315 N.E.2d 530 (1974).
It was, therefore, up to the prosecution to require
Officer Huish to articulate any proable cause he may have had
to arrest appellant.

At no time did Officer Huish state any

probable cause, if any existed, for the arrest of appellant.
As the burden was on the prosecution to produce any such evider.•:·
and it failed to do so, it cannot now argue that there was
probable cause for the arrest after all.
H.

THIS ISSUE IS PRESERVED BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S OBJECTION.

At the time the prosecution moved for the admission into
evidence of the gun found in the search, defense counsel made
an objection.

-24-

Mr. Valdez:
I would object at this
time, Your Honor.
I don't think
there's any probable cause on which
to pull the vehicle over. Certainly
no probable cause to make an extended
search of the vehicle.
I would object
to that (the gun) as being introduced
into evidence at this time.
(Tr.73).
The Court denied the objection and received the gun
into evidence.

The issue of the validity of the search was

clearly preserved by the above-quoted objection by defense
counsel.

At the very least, when defense counsel objected the

Court should have required the prosecution to inquire further
into Officer Huish's reasons for stopping the truck and arresting appellant.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN A FINDING OF GUILTY.
Appellant was found guilty of Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by a Restricted Person.

Although several witnesses

testified at appellant's trial, only one witness, David McCoy,
testified that appellant had possession of the gun in question.
As having possession is one of the essential elements of the
offense in question, it is necessary that sufficient evidence
exist to establish the fact that appellant did, in fact, possess
the gun.
The standard for reversal of a conviction for insufficiency
of the evidence is whether, after reveiwing all the evidence
and drawing all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
-25-

it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence
"is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable

(so

that) reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable dout_
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convict,
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).
Since David McCoy was the only witness who testified
that the gun was in appellant's possession, his testimony must
be examined carefully.

If McCoy's testimony does not

establi~

the element of possession, then the evidence cannot be said
to be sufficient to uphold the verdict in this case.
Several courts have examined the evidence to determine
its sufficiency when a conviction is based on the testimony of
one witness whose credibility is drawn into question because oi
the witness's bias or lack of truthfulness.

Those courts have

ruled that such testimony must be looked at very carefully so
that a defendant will not be unfairly convicted by evidence
given by a witness who is not credible.
In Gaddis v. St:ite, 251 N.E.2d 658
defendant's robbery
of one witness.

(Ind. 1969), the

conviction was based upon the testimony

That witness admitted that he had been told

he would go to prison if he did not testify against the

defenda~

Also the witness's testimony kept changing regarding how posit0
he was in identifying the defendant.

In reversing defendant's

conviction for insufficient evidence, the court stated:
This court must be particularly vigilant
where a conviction is supported by the
-26-

testimony of one eyewitness. Testimonial
errors resulting from imperfect recollection,
defective perception or suggestion have
been shown to occur and we would be careful
not to implement a miscarriage of justice
in such a situation where that testimony
is the only testimony of appellant's guilt.
Where the evidence merely tends to support
a conclusion of guilt it is not enough;
it must support such a conclusion beyond
a reasonable doubt (citation omitted).
To hold otherwise would violate the presumption of innocence until guilt is
proven.
Gaddis v. State, 251 N.E.2d at 662.
The court in People v. Williams, 357 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1976),
reversed the defendant's murder conviction becuase the testimony
of the two supposed eyewitnesses, Jones and Robinson, were both
tainted by their own interests.

Robinson had never mentioned

any involvement by the defendant in the crime until he was
informed that he was going to be charged with the crime.

Jones

also had an interest in that he was promised by the State that
he would be released from prison if he testified against the
defendant.

In addition, the testimony of Robinson at trial

was inconsistent in many instances from his testimony at prior
hearings.

In explaining its reasoning

for reversing the

conviction, the Court stated:
Robinson agreed to make a statement only
after the police informed him that he
would be charged with the murder of the
cab driver.
Robinson was an interested
person, therefore, who did have a motive
to implicate the defendant in the murder.
considering this fact, together with the
inconsistent testimony given by Robinson,
we find that Robinson's testimony was
entitled to little weight.
-27-

The State relied primarily upon the
testimony of Larry Jones to corroborate Robinson.
Jones' credibility was
severely limited, however, by the
revelation that he had agreed to
testify only after bein'J promised by
the State that his immediate release
from prison would be arranged. Jones,
who had served a little over two years
of a 15-to-30-year prison sentence, had
much to gain by testifying for the State.
While that fact alone did not necessarily
destroy Jones' credibility, we have held
that when it appears that a witness has
hopes of a reward from the prosecution,
his testimony should not be accepted
unless it carries with it an absolute
conviction of its truth.
People v. Williams, 357 N.E.2d at 529-30.
The facts of the present case are very similar to the fac
of Gaddis v. State, supra, and People v. Williams, supra, in
regard to the testimony against appellant by David McCoy.

The

gun which appellant was accused of possessing was found in the
truck owned and being driven by McCoy.

McCoy had a very

definite interest in not being thought by Officer Huish to haw
possessed the gun himself since he was on felony probation
at the time.
McCoy indicated that while testifying, that his probation
would likely be revoked and he would go to prison if he were
to be convicted of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person.

McCoy, then, was most certainly an interest;

witness, one who had a great deal to gain if someone riding
in his truck on the day in question,other than himself, were
found to be in possession of the gun Officer Huish found.
-28-

Mccc:

1

nterest is closely analagous to the interest of the witnesses

in the Gaddis and Williams cases, supra, where the witnesses
were all interested in not being themselves charged with a crime
or in getting out of prison.
In both Gaddis and Williams, supra, the testimony of
the witnesses contained inconsistencies whichfurtherbrought
their testimony into question.

McCoy's testimony, too, was

inconsistent with his prior statement to Mike Perry at the
time appellant was arrested.

McCoy apparently told Mike Perry

something about the possession of the gun which differed greatly
from his testimony at trial, although we do not know precisely
what his statement was because the court would not allow Perry
to testify about the contents of McCoy's statement.

See Point

I, supra.
Given these serious weaknesses in McCoy's testimony,
his clear interest in seeing that appellant was convicted, and
the inconsistency between his trial testimony and his prior
statement to Perry regarding the essence of this offense,

i.e., whether appellant had possession of the gun, his testimony can be given little or no weight.

As McCoy was the only

witness who placed the gun in appellant's possession, the
prosecution did not me.et

its burden of proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons that are discussed above, appellant
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the conviciton
and judgment entered against him in the Court below.
DATED this ~day of September, 1984.
Respectfully submitted,

LISA J.
MAL
Attorney for Appellant

DELIVERED two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
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